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In the fifty-one years since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
enacted to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action,"" the landscape of Federal civil litigation 2 has changed dramati-
cally. Technological innovations 3 and evolving attitudes in society and the
bar have transformed the number and types of cases brought and pursued
in Federal courts." In contrast to this dynamic legal environment, several
of the Federal Rules, or portions of them, have remained static. Conse-
quently, judicial constructions of these Rules have evolved to take into
account the changing nature of the disputes they regulate.
One such evolution involves rule 9(b), which governs the pleading of
I. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
2. Discussion in this Note is limited to the Federal legal system. While much of the analysis
applies to state legal systems as well, they are beyond the scope of this Note.
3. Since 1938, new technologies such as photocopying machines, word processors, computerized
litigation support systems, on-line databases, telefacsimile machines, and overnight delivery services
have revolutionized the practice of law. Tasks such as drafting and filing a brief that once took weeks
now take days or hours. For example, at the time the Federal Rules were initially drafted it might
have been physically impossible to pursue an action the size of the IBM antitrust litigation or the
Washington Public Power Supply System bond default litigation. Today, these "megacases," involving
several hundred thousand documents and/or hundreds of plaintiffs, while not routine, are at least
manageable.
4. For example, private securities fraud claims were virtually unknown at the time the Federal
Rules were adopted. The first case recognizing a private cause of action for damages under § 10(b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), and rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987), was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946). These cases have since multiplied and grown into a "judicial oak." Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
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fraud, mistake, and condition of the mind.5 In 1979, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit began requiring plaintiffs in securities actions
brought pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
19346 and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder 7 to plead scienter8 with
particularity pursuant to rule 9(b).9 The principal result of this require-
ment has been to permit district courts within the Second Circuit to dis-
miss nuisance suits' 0 on the basis of the complaint alone. Other circuits
have declined to follow the Second Circuit," and several scholars and
commentators have argued against this use of rule 9(b). 2
This Note argues that, with a slight modification, the Second Circuit's
interpretation of rule 9(b) is a narrowly tailored response to section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 nuisance litigation, and should be adopted nationally."3
Part I describes rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement and documents the
split in the circuits. Part II discusses the theoretical reasons for the exis-
tence of nuisance litigation and explains why securities law is particularly
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) provides: "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances consti-
tuting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condi-
tions of mind of a person may be averred generally."
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
8. Scienter is "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976). "[S]cienter is an element of a violation of § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought." Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 192 n.7, 193 (scienter is an essential element
of cause of action for damages under § 10(b) and'rule 10b-5).
9. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
The Ross court held that, although plaintiffs cannot reasonably be expected to plead defendant's ac-
tual knowledge before discovery, the first sentence of rule 9(b) ("circumstances constituting fraud...
shall be stated with particularity") requires plaintiffs "to supply a factual basis for their conclusory
allegations regarding [defendant's scienter)" in the complaint. Id. The Second Circuit thus allows
plaintiffs to aver scienter generally as required by the second sentence of rule 9(b), as long as they
"specifically plead those events which they assert give rise to a strong inference that the defendants
[acted with scienter]" in accordance with the first sentence of the rule. Id.
10. A "nuisance" or "strike" suit is an action "in which the plaintiff is able to obtain a positive
settlement from the defendant even though the defendant knows the plaintiff's case is sufficiently weak
that he would be unwilling or unlikely actually to pursue his case to trial." Rosenberg & Shavell, A
Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3 (1985).
It is an action that has a "settlement value independent of its merits." Coffee, Understanding the
Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLuM. L. REV. 669, 669 n.1 (1986); see also Nazario, Hard Line
Pays as Firm Fights Nuisance Suits, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1988, at Bi, col. 6 (Standard Brands Paint
Company "defines a nuisance lawsuit as a case that lacks merit but would cost more to defend than to
settle").
11. See infra notes 19-23.
12. Lees, Rule 9(b)-Who Needs It?, 3 J, CONTEMP. L. 105 (1976); Marcus, The Revival of
Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUm. L. REv. 433 (1986); Rich-
man, Lively & Mell, The Pleading of Fraud: Rhyms Without Reason, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 959
(1987); Sovern, Reconsidering Federal Civil Rule 9(b): Do We Need Particularized Pleading Re-
quirements in Fraud Cases?, 104 F.R.D. 143 (1985); Comment, Pleading Constructive Fraud in
Securities Litigation-Avoiding Dismissal For Failur to Plead Fraud With Particularity, 33 Em-
ORY L.J. 517 (1984); Note, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims With Particularity Under Rule 9(b),
97 HARV. L. REV. 1432 (1984).
13. While this Note focuses solely on claims and actions under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the ana-
lytic framework it employs could be applied to other instances where rule 9(b) is applicable and
strong incentives for nuisance litigation exist.
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susceptible to this form of abuse. Part III addresses briefly the policy jus-
tifications for discouraging and dismissing nuisance actions. Part IV ana-
lyzes the opposing positions in terms of these policy considerations and
proposes a limited discovery procedure that both incorporates the Second
Circuit's interpretation of rule 9(b) and limits its inherent risk of dis-
missing meritorious suits.
I. THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS
In 1976, the Supreme Court modified the substantive requirements for
actions commenced and claims made under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Court held that a private cause of
action for damages under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 will not lie "in the
absence of any allegation [that the defendants acted with] 'scienter' -
intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud."' 4 While it did not examine the
policy considerations underlying its action, the Court implied in dicta that
a corollary purpose of the decision was to deter nuisance suits. 5
The Hochfelder Court did not indicate the pleading standard to be ap-
plied to the new substantive scienter requirement. The circuits already
had agreed that rule 9(b) applies to section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 claims,
since they are fraud-based.' Moreover, virtually all circuits have applied
a similar standard to the non-scienter allegations in section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 claims based upon information and belief, requiring that such alle-
gations be accompanied by a statement setting forth the facts upon which
the belief is founded.' However, the circuits have divided over the speci-
ficity with which a plaintiff must allege scienter. In averments of scienter,
the Second Circuit requires plaintiffs to plead circumstances that "provide
14. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 192 n.7, 193 (1976); see supra note 8 (definition
of scienter).
15. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214-15 n.33 ("[W]e are not the first court to express concern that the
inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiff who may sue [under § 10(b)] will ultimately result in
more harm than good." (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 747-48
(1975))).
16. See, e.g., Tomera v. Gault, 511 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1975); Walling v. Beverly Enters.,
476 F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1973); Kellman v. ICS, Inc., 447 F.2d 1305, 1309 (6th Cir. 1971).
17. Stern v. Leucadia Nat'l Corp., 844 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 137
(1988) (quotation of press speculation as to Leucadia's motives and press reports of other transactions
in which Leucadia assertedly greenmailed other corporate targets not sufficient facts to support allega-
tion that Leucadia never had any intention of acquiring target); Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441, 444
(1st Cir. 1985) (complaint contained no facts upon which plaintiff's belief could be founded); Semegen
v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985) (complaint lacked "specification of any times, dates,
places or other details" of defendant's alleged involvement in fraudulent scheme); Wayne Inv., Inc. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 739 F.2d 11, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1984) (speculations of industry analysts that Gulf not
conducting merger negotiations in good faith not sufficient facts to support allegation that Gulf fraud-
ulently promised to use "best efforts" to consummate merger); Walling v. Beverly Enters., 476 F.2d at
397 (statement of time, place, and nature of alleged fraudulent activities satisfies requirements of rule
9(b)); Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 444 (2d Cir. 1971) (mere conclusory
allegations that defendant's conduct was fraudulent or in violation of rule lOb-5 not sufficient to
satisfy rule 9(b)); Duane v. Altenburg, 297 F.2d 515, 518 (7th Cir. 1962) (allegations of fraud made
on information and belief must be accompanied by statement of facts upon which belief is founded).
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a factual foundation for otherwise conclusory allegations of scienter."' 1
The First, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits apply a more relaxed
standard. The First Circuit has held that "[tihe clear weight of authority
is that Rule 9 requires specification of the time, place, and content of an
alleged false representation, but not the circumstances or evidence from
which fraudulent intent could be inferred."19 The Third,20 Sixth,21
Ninth,22 and Tenth" Circuits have taken similar positions.
I. THE ECONOMIC ROOTS OF SECTION 10(b) AND RULE 10b-5
NUISANCE LITIGATION
While there are other reasons for a stricter pleading requirement in
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 litigation,2 deterring and dismissing nui-
sance litigation provides a sound basis for the requirement.25 The inherent
characteristics of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 class-action litigation, as
well as the economic incentives facing a professional plaintiff's attorney,2'
create strong incentives for the initiation of such actions.
18. Stern, 844 F.2d at 1004; Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Fluor Corp., 808 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir.
1987); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946
(1980); see supra note 9 (Second Circuit construction of rule 9(b)).
19. McGinty v. Beranger Volkswagen, Inc., 633 F.2d 226, 228 (Ist Cir. 1980) (citing Cramer v.
General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 272-73 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129
(1979); Felton v. Walston & Co., 508 F.2d 577, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1974); Walling v. Beverly Enters.,
476 F.2d at 397; 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1297,
at 403-04; § 1298, at 410, § 1301, at 426 (1969); 2A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
9.03, at 9-23 (2d ed. 1979)).
20. Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d at 273 ("The second sentence of Rule 9(b)
requires only that 'intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind . . . be averred generally! . . .
[Gleneral allegation of the defendants' state of mind meets the minimal requirements of the second
sentence of Rule 9(b)." (emphasis in original)).
21. Auslender v. Energy Management Corp., 832 F.2d 354, 356 (6th Cir. 1987) ("[M]alice, in-
tent or knowledge may be averred generally. . . . [Tihe allegation of 'recklessness' on the part of [the
defendant] is adequate to satisfy the scienter requirement of Rule lob-5.").
22. Walling v. Beverly Enters., 476 F.2d at 397 ("Nor does Rule 9(b) require any particularity in
connection with an averment of intent, knowledge or condition of the mind.").
23. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Carlstedt, 800 F.2d 1008, 1011 (10th Cir. 1986) (" 'Rule 9(b)
does not. . . require any particularity in connection with an averment of intent, knowledge, or condi-
tion of mind.'" (quoting Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 774-75 (D. Colo.
1964))).
24. Courts advance two other justifications for applying the enhanced rule 9(b) requirement.
First, it gives a defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests,
thereby enabling the defendant to prepare a defense. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 557 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980). Second, it protects the defendant from harm to her
reputation or goodwill that might result from unfounded charges of fraud. Decker v. Massey-
Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 1982).
25. Contra Note, supra note 12, at 1439-40 ("On close analysis. . . the policy of deterring and
controlling [nuisance] suits fails to justify the dismissal of securities fraud claims under rule 9(b).");
Cf. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 888 (5th ed. 1980)
(nuisance litigation is "an over-the-hill dragon, puffed into life to frighten the courts away from
deciding substantive issues").
26. A professional plaintiff's attorney is a lawyer the bulk of whose practice involves representing
plaintiffs on a contingent fee basis. Professional plaintiff's attorneys represent an identifiable subsec-
tion of the Bar. In the securities field, they are known as "shareholders lawyers." Borden, The Share-
holder Suit Charade, AM. LAW., Dec. 1989, at 67, 68.
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A. Entrepreneurial Litigation
Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 suits usually take the form of class actions
where plaintiff's counsel functions in an "entrepreneurial mode."'27 In the
typical case, class counsel and the nominal plaintiff act as joint ventur-
ers.28 Counsel provides the intellectual and pecuniary capital,29 while the
nominal plaintiff contributes the cause of action. Both venturers expect to
earn a return on their investment at some future time. Conflicts of inter-
est30 and the balance of power within this symbiotic relationship leave
members of the plaintiff class with little incentive or ability to monitor
class counsel's actions.3" Plaintiff's counsel thus controls all major strategic
decisions and effectively assumes the role of plaintiff.32 As a result, plain-
tiff's counsel is able to act opportunistically in her own best interests.
One such interest of plaintiff's counsel is to obtain a large and stable
income stream.33 In this regard, professional plaintiff's counsel views each
potential suit as a proffered investment opportunity. As a rational inves-
tor, counsel decides whether or not to add the action to her "portfolio"
27. Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in
the Large Class Action, 54 U. CH. L. REv. 877, 882 (1987).
28. Coffee, supra note 10, at 670 n.2.
29. Class counsel invests intellectual capital in the litigation by providing her services on a contin-
gent fee basis. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(j)(2) (1983) (lawyer may
"contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case"). Also, class counsel may, and
generally does, contribute pecuniary capital by bearing all court costs and expenses of litigation. See
id. Rule 1.8(e)(1) ("lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of
which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter").
30. Professor Coffee has noted:
It is no secret that substantial conflicts of interest between attorney and client can arise in class
action litigation. In the language of economics, this is an "agency cost" problem. All principal-
agent relationships give rise to agency costs, which consist of (1) the costs of monitoring the
agent, (2) the costs the agent incurs to advertise or guarantee his fidelity ("bonding" costs), and
(3) the residual costs of opportunistic behavior that it is not cost-efficient to prevent. The
classic agency cost problem in class actions involves the "sweetheart" settlement, in which the
plaintiff's attorney trades a high fee award for a low recovery.
Coffee, supra note 27, at 883.
31. Several factors contribute to this monitoring deficit in class actions. First, plaintiffs are not
sufficiently sophisticated to recognize and participate in critical litigation decisions. Second, plaintiffs
in securities class actions typically have suffered atomized losses and do not anticipate individual
recoveries sufficient to justify the cost of monitoring. Third, no informed market exists for "shares" in
a lawsuit. In the absence of such a market, class-action plaintiffs have no means of disciplining coun-
sel by selling out. Finally, because the attorney is the major investor in that she researches, prepares,
and finances the entrepreneurial action, class-action plaintiffs become merely a "ticket to ride," and
their role is trivialized. Since they have made no real investment of their own, members of the client
class possess no leverage and have little incentive to enforce a demand for control of the enterprise. Id.
at 884-85.
32. Coffee, supra note 10, at 683.
33. See Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation,
48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 12 (Summer 1985) (plaintiff's attorney is an entrepreneur "who
predictably will act to maximize his expected return and to minimize his risk").
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based on several investment criteria, including resource constraints,3 4 ex-
pected return,3" risk aversion, 6 and ethical considerations.
The portfolio management incentives facing plaintiff's counsel suggest
that it is in her best interest to file many suits, with a minimal investment
of resources in each suit. 37 In seeking to maximize a stable, contingent fee-
based revenue stream from her investments, plaintiff's counsel will seek a
diverse portfolio of suits in order to minimize her dependence on the out-
come of any one action. A professional plaintiff's counsel can maintain a
"diverse" portfolio by filing numerous actions. 8 Further, she will seek to
minimize her "position" in any given suit to guard against losses due to
adverse judgments. For example, an attorney can minimize her research
investment in each case by litigating in a limited area of the law, since
litigation in any area of law requires some specialized knowledge.
In sum, in the contingent fee context of the typical class action, strong
entrepreneurial incentives influence plaintiff's counsel to initiate a maxi-
mum number of suits requiring a minimum investment of resources in
each action. These incentives are reinforced by the "litigation differential"
in section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 class actions.
B. The Litigation Differential
The "litigation differential"3" in corporate litigation expresses the fact
that it is often less expensive for a plaintiff to initiate and maintain an
34. A plaintiff's attorney will refuse a proffered investment opportunity if she is unable to devote
sufficient resources to pursue it effectively. For example, her firm may simply lack the physical or
financial capacity to take on the new matter, or she may be unwilling to expend the extra hours
necessary to initiate the action if her support staff already is overextended.
35. Plaintiff's counsel will not pursue a claim when she does not expect to receive a fee award
(from the court or the defendant) large enough to pay a competitive return on her investment in
litigation expenses and to cover her opportunity costs. Coffee, supra note 10, at 695. Counsel calcu-
lates her expected fee based on factors such as the potential size of the fee, the probability of receiving
that fee, and the point in time she expects to receive the fee.
36. A risk-neutral plaintiff's attorney would be indifferent between pursuing a case having a 10%
chance of generating $10,000,000 in fees and one having a 50% probability of a $2,000,000 payoff. In
practice, an attorney is constrained by custom, social convention and legal ethics from making "co-
variant" litigation investments, and she is unable to achieve optimal portfolio diversification. Id. at
705 & n.100. As a result of suboptimal portfolio diversification and other practical considerations such
as meeting the firm payroll and paying monthly overhead costs, plaintiff's counsel may not behave like
a risk-neutral investor and may, on balance, prefer the 50% chance of a $2,000,000 return in the
example above. See Coffee, supra note 33, at 12 (plaintiff's attorney predictably will act to minimize
her risk).
37. Coffee, supra note 33, at 22-23.
38. A plaintiff's attorney can diversify the risk inherent in her portfolio of actions in two ways: by
making co-variant litigation investments or by filing as many actions as possible, given her resource
constraints. In practice, a plaintiff's attorney cannot make co-variant litigation investments. Coffee,
supra note 10, at 705 & n.100. Thus, her only option in diversifying her portfolio is to file as many
suits as her resources will allow.
39. Professor Geoffrey Miller coined the term "litigation differential" in his article An Econonic
Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 99 (1986). Professor Miller defined the litigation differ-
ential at any given time as "the sum of defendant's attorneys' fees, plaintiff's attorneys' fees, defen-
dant's costs, and plaintiff's costs. These are the 'direct costs' of going to trial rather than settling." Id.
(footnote omitted).
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action than it is for a corporation to defend the action. More specifically,
the litigation differential is the difference between the cost to the plaintiff
of initiating and maintaining a sui 4  and the expected cost to the defen-
dant of preparing and trying the case to judgment.41 It is a structural
phenomenon which exists independently of the merits of the plaintiff's
claim."2
At any point in time after a plaintiff has initiated an action, the defen-
dant has two options: litigate the matter to judgment or pursue a strategy
aimed at settling the dispute.43 In deciding whether to fight or settle, cor-
porate decisionmakers tend to give more weight to the relative expense of
the two options than to the merits of the suit.44 The rational corporate
defendant will prefer settling a claim, irrespective of its merits, as long as
the cost of settlement is less than the expected cost of litigating to judg-
ment.45 Thus, when a litigation differential exists, settlement at any
amount between plaintiff's costs of initiating and maintaining the action to
date and defendant's prospective costs of litigating the action to judgment
can be a profit maximizing outcome for both parties.4" In cases where
known facts indicate that a litigation differential exists, a class-action
plaintiff's counsel may thus appropriate some portion of the differential
merely by filing suit, irrespective of the merits of her case. Plaintiff's
counsel believes that the corporate defendant will prefer to settle for some
For purposes of this Note, "litigation differential" will mean the difference between plaintiff's sunk
attorney's fees and costs and defendant's sunk and expected future attorneys' fees and costs. The
litigation differential as employed in this Note attempts to model the pecuniary values evaluated by
each party at any point in time in deciding whether to settle the dispute or continue litigating tojudgment. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
40. These costs include court filing fees and other disbursements as well as the opportunity cost of
the attorneys' time and any sanctions generated by their actions.
41. See also Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 10 (describing model of litigation process that
incorporates litigation differential); Coffee, supra note 27 (discussing effect of litigation differential on
class actions).
42. For a discussion of the causes of the litigation differential in § 10(b) and rule lob-5 actions,
see infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
43. The fact that a plaintiff, merely by filing suit, can force defendant to expend the substantial
resources required to prepare a defense or to settle, independent of the merits of the suit, has also been
called the In terroremn settlement value of a complaint. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 741 (1975).
44. The "expense" of each option includes both quantifiable costs (such as attorneys' fees and
court expenses) and non-quantifiable costs (such as executives' time, lost reputational capital, and
decreased certainty). For a more detailed description of the components of these costs, see Coffee,
supra note 27, at 891 & nn.33-34; Coffee, supra note 10, at 701-02 & nn.93-94; Coffee, supra note
33, at 17-18.
45. At least one experienced Federal judge maintains that candidates for settlement are readily
identifiable:
They are the cases in which the amount involved is small in relation to the anticipated costs of
litigation, or in which relief other than the payment of money is the plaintiff's principal objec-
tive and it is less painful for the defendant to give that relief than to bear the expense of
further litigation.
Tone, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, in SEMINARS FOR NEWLY APPOINTED
UNITED STATES DISTRITar JuDGES 57, 62 (1975).
46. The plaintiff has obtained a settlement in excess of her sunk costs. The defendant has termi-
nated a problem at a lower cost and more quickly than through litigation to judgment.
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amount in excess of its costs and that she and her clients may profit from
the litigation differential.4"
The litigation differential is marked in section 10(b) actions. Defen-
dafits typically face substantially higher costs of engaging in section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 litigation than do plaintiffs.4 The litigation differential in
section 10(b) lawsuits is also peculiarly appropriable for several reasons.
First, both plaintiff's and defendant's counsel are acutely aware of the
existence of the litigation differential in these actions and can gauge its
size.4" Second, the defendants in section 10(b) actions usually are corpora-
tions and their managers. The defendants are subject to the "tyranny of
the quarterly report," and their decisions concerning whether to litigate
are commonly based on cost/benefit analyses in which the merits of any
lawsuit are but one factor. If it is cheaper to settle than to fight, they will
settle.50 Third, securities lawsuit defendants generally are not repeat
"players" in the securities litigation "game." 1 As infrequent litigants,
they have little incentive to deviate from the least expensive option in any
one action by employing strategic tactics designed to enhance their reputa-
47. Plaintiff's attorneys who are known for capitalizing on the litigation differential have received
the "colorful" appellation of "pilgrims" from their associates at the bar. These "early settlers" are a
specific identifiable subset of the plaintiff's bar. Coffee, supra note 33, at 44 & n.122; Borden, supra
note 26, at 68.
48. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 697 n.79 ("The conventional wisdom is that litigation costs [in
class and derivative actions] tend to be lower for plaintiffs than defendants.").
According to data compiled by The Wyatt Company, an insurance consulting firm, the average
cost of defending a claim made against corporate directors was $461,000 in 1984. It is highly
doubtful that plaintiffs spend (or could spend) even a substantial fraction of this amount on a
per action basis.
Id. at 702 n.94 (citing Schatz, Focus on Corporate Boards: Directors Feel the Legal Heat, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 15, 1985, at F13, col. 2).
The amended complaint in Stern v. Leucadia Nat'l Corp., 844 F.2d 997 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 137 (1988), provides a concrete example of the litigation differential. The district court
awarded Leucadia $7500 for the costs incurred in making its second motion to dismiss. Stern, 844
F.2d at 1003. The amendments to the complaint consisted of citations to several news articles specu-
lating about Leucadia's intentions in the transaction, all of which would have been available from one
or more on-line news databases such as Nexis, Dow Jones New Service, or Investext. It is highly
unlikely that plaintiff's counsel invested half as much time and money researching and preparing the
amended complaint as defense counsel billed Leucadia for responding to it.
49. The securities bar has commented on the phenomenon extensively. See, e.g., Rosenberg &
Shavell, supra note 10; Coffee, supra note 27. Moreover, as sophisticated players in this game, the
members of this bar are well informed concerning both their own costs and those of their opponents.
50. Corporate managers are under continuing pressure to operate their enterprises as profitably as
possible. The market price of a corporation's stock is influenced strongly by its reported earnings.
Managers are thus under greater pressure to keep earnings high from month to month rather than
over a long term. This pressure causes managers to view the short-run costs of settling versus litigat-
ing in dollar terms, rather than the merits of the suit, as the criterion to be used in making the fight/
settle decision. See Nazario, supra note 10, at B1, col. 6, B6, col. 4 (most companies choose to settle
cases that lack merit but would cost more to defend than to settle; senior vice president of Pie 'N' Save
Corp. says company may adopt policy of fighting such nuisance suits if there is evidence that doing so
would lessen overall legal costs without hurting company's reputation in community or its sales).
51. The results of the most complete study of the incidence of litigation against corporations indi-
cate that an average public corporation faces derivative or securities class-action litigation only once
every 17.6 years. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Incidence of Shareholder Derivative and
Class Action Lawsuits, 1971-1978, 60 B.U.L. REv. 306, 316 (1980).
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tion for toughness and deter future nuisance suit plaintiffs. 52 Fourth, set-
tlement offers something that corporate managers value highly: certainty.
Managers are willing to pay a premium for this certainty because it
removes a problem from their desks by reducing an unknown to a known.
Settlement also removes a contingency from their companies' financial
statements that has costs independent of the litigation itself.53
The existence and the appropriability of the litigation differential in
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 actions, combined with the entrepreneurial
incentives influencing plaintiff's counsel, encourage her to file as many
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 suits as possible.5" Relative indifference to
the merits and an interest in making a minimal investment of resources in
each suit thus produce nuisance litigation.55
III. POLICY GOALS GOVERNING ANTIDOTES TO SECTION 10(b) AND
RULE 10b-5 NUISANCE LITIGATION
In the short run, the quantity of Federal judicial resources is fixed. In
light of this fact, a critical goal of the Federal legal system is to make
efficient use of the existing judicial resources by conserving, to the extent
52. Defendants who appear frequently in the securities litigation arena have incentives to focus on
the long-term effects of each action and invest in reputational capital by resisting frivolous actions
even when it would be cheaper to settle each individual case. By earning and maintaining reputations
as "tough, hard-nosed litigators who will not settle weak cases," repeat players such as accounting
firms and insurance companies seek to deter future nuisance actions. Coffee, supra note 33, at 14; see
Nazario, supra note 10, at B6, col. 4 (senior counsel for Stop & Shop Cos. believes "[i]n the long run,
Standard Brands' policy [of fighting rather than settling all nuisance suits] 'will probably dissuade
people from suing them' because plaintiffs' attorneys 'won't think they are an easy mark'. .. ").
Stern v. Leucadia Nat'l Corp., 844 F.2d 997 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 137 (1988), dis-
cussed supra note 48, may provide a concrete example of this phenomenon. Leucadia is in the busi-
ness of participating in corporate change of control transactions. As a result, Leucadia is a repeat
securities litigant and therefore had strong incentives to litigate rather than settle Stem's claim in the
hope of deterring future strike suits. In the end, Leucadia's tenacity was rewarded; the Second Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of Stern's complaint on a rule 9(b) motion. Id. at 1006.
53. It is also important that corporate managers pay settlements with "other people's money."
Plaintiff's lore has it that it is easier to obtain a settlement from the managers of a publicly held
corporation, where the stockholders or the customers ultimately take the "hit," than it is to settle with
a partnership, where the principals must often pay the settlement personally. Corporate managers
also may not feel that their personal reputations have been impugned or need defending, so they may
not be as disposed to fight, either as a matter of principle or on personal grounds, as partners are.
54. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
55. One commentator has written:
During the dealmaking boom of the 1980s . . . a particular mutation of the shareholder class
action has flourished-the automatic complaint. As Chancellor Allen lectured at the Champion
settlement hearing in August, "Every time there is an announced offer, there is an industry of
class action lawyers who will file a suit, even when a board is fully independent and fully
functioning to meet its obligations." ...
Joseph Rosenthal, a leading local plaintiffs [sic] counsel . . . disputes this notion. "That
may be the perception, . . . [blut my view is that few deals result in serious litigation." And,
he asserts, plaintiffs [sic] counsel drop "the bulk of the cases" after determining that sharehold-
ers have been treated fairly.
That only confirms the point.
Borden, supra note 26, at 68 (emphasis supplied) (discussing securities fraud actions in Delaware
courts). Only one in 10 suits has merit, but which one is not known when they are filed. Id. at 69
(quoting Charles Richards, Jr.).
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possible, the resources expended on any one action.56 This policy maxim
dictates that legal institutions governing litigation in general, and section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 litigation in particular, 7 should discourage and dis-
miss summarily non-meritorious suits, so long as this can be accomplished
without unduly impeding meritorious suits. Affording judges a means of
dealing summarily with nuisance litigation will reduce the amount of ju-
dicial resources expended on dispatching non-meritorious claims, thereby
allowing courts to expend their limited resources on resolving meritorious
disputes.
Antidotes to nuisance litigation will also help preserve the integrity and
legitimacy of the judicial process. The securities nuisance litigation-
settlement cycle constitutes abuse of process by the plaintiff's bar at the
expense of the target defendants' shareholders and customers. To fund the
settlement of non-meritorious suits, defendants may need to reduce or
eliminate dividends to their shareholders, take an earnings "hit," and/or
raise product prices and pass the cost on to the consuming public. In addi-
tion, this misappropriation receives a legal imprimatur that ultimately un-
dermines public confidence in the legal system.5 8 A procedural device that
reduces or eliminates plaintiff's counsel's economic incentives to perpetrate
this abuse will serve fundamental policy interests.
However, any solution that minimizes waste of judicial resources and
extortionate abuse of process must not frustrate meritorious suits unduly.
Meritorious lawsuits could be inappropriately deterred or dismissed under
procedural rules that place unreasonable demands on a plaintiff's knowl-
edge or ability to commit resources. Such overly restrictive procedural
rules would thus diminish the effectiveness of the substantive securities
law in deterring and punishing, and remedying the consequences of, fraud
and other proscribed behavior. 9 In addition, overly restrictive pleading
56. Increased efficiency provides one way to reduce the crowded dockets facing the Federal courts
without an added expenditure of taxpayer dollars on additional judicial resources. Increased judicial
efficiency also increases public confidence in the legal system. The celebrated person in the street
continues to believe, and not without reason, that justice delayed is justice denied.
57. In 1988, class actions accounted for 0.4% of the Federal courts' total workload, and securities
class actions accounted for 14.6% of all the class actions filed. 1989 CLASS ACTION REP. 7 (citing
Report of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for fiscal year 1988). However, "class
and derivative actions are typically complex and time consuming, proceed at a glacial pace, and tend
to proliferate a variety of collateral issues." Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the
Model of the Lauzyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215, 228 (1983). In
addition, "[slecurities class actions tend to involve more judicial time than most cases." Summit &
Leber, Posing the Question, 'Whodunwhat?': Using Rule 9(b) to Challenge Securities-Fraud Actions,
Nat'l L.J., Dec. 24, 1984, at 15, col. 1.
58. To the extent the public perceives the ability of certain individuals to obtain undeserved re-
turns through the use of the courts, it should undermine their confidence in the legal system as a
whole.
59. Enforcement of the securities laws by the Securities and Exchange Commission and "private
attorneys general" serves the dual purposes of compensating persons injured by violations of those
laws and deterring future wrongdoing. Lerach, Securities Class Actions and Derivative Litigations
Involving Public Companies: A Plaintiffs Perspective, 491 PLI-CORP. 7, 63-64 (1985) (citing Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396-97 (1970); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432
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requirements would themselves undermine public confidence in the legal
system.60
IV. ANALYSIS AND A PROPOSAL
This Part first analyzes the opposing judicial views with respect to the
use of rule 9(b) to dismiss and to deter section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 nui-
sance litigation in light of the competing policy goals noted above. It then
suggests a new procedure with which courts could deter and dismiss sum-
marily nuisance actions while not impeding meritorious suits.
A. Analysis
The Second Circuit interpretation of rule 9(b), requiring plaintiffs to
"specifically plead those events which they assert give rise to a strong in-
ference that the defendants had [scienter],""' has three advantages over the
contrary view:62 it deters the commencement of nuisance litigation more
effectively; it provides a more effective tool for dismissing nuisance suits
that are initiated; and it makes more efficient use of judicial resources.
However, the stricter pleading requirement may result in undue deter-
rence and dismissal of meritorious claims.
The Second Circuit position operates directly on the economic incen-
tives to initiate nuisance litigation by narrowing the litigation differential
substantially in two ways. First, it reduces the cost of litigating a non-
meritorious claim to judgment. Afforded the opportunity to dispose of
lawsuits at the pleading stage at a relatively modest cost, defendants can
be expected to seek vindication through the courts rather than agreeing to
expensive, unjust settlements that appropriate money from their share-
holders and customers.63 Second, the Second Circuit interpretation of rule
9(b) raises the cost to plaintiff's counsel of commencing and maintaining a
suit by increasing the level of factual and legal inquiry necessary to meet
the stricter scienter pleading requirement.64 The Second Circuit rule thus
reduces plaintiff's counsel's perceived litigation differential, decreasing the
chance that filing a suit will afford her a sufficient return on her antici-
pated investment in the nuisance action.
(1964)). To the extent that procedural rules interfere with or prevent this enforcement, they limit its
effectiveness as a remedy and deterrent.
60. Public confidence in the legal system is undermined when defendants who "did it" are "let
off" on procedural technicalities.
61. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946
(1980).
62. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
63. It could be argued that the Second Circuit standard results in an increase in motion practice
and thus requires more judicial resources than the majority position. This argument ignores the fact
that hearing motions requires far less judicial time and energy than trying cases.
64. This extra research has an additional and often ignored benefit. During the course of this
additional inquiry, a well-meaning but mistaken plaintiff's counsel may uncover facts that will lead
her not to initiate the action.
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Conversely, the position of the other circuits invites nuisance litigation.
Proving scienter is a difficult exercise, requiring extensive discovery in
which plaintiff's counsel can impose significant costs on the defendant at a
relatively low cost to herself.65 Accordingly, introducing a substantive sci-
enter requirement66 increases the amount of resources a defendant expects
to expend in complying with discovery requests. Without a corresponding
procedural requirement that reduces the probability that the defendant
will have to expend these resources, the litigation differential increases.
The other circuits' position increases the differential further because their
scienter pleading requirement is more easily met. Merely alleging scienter
"on information and belief" is much less expensive than expending the
resources necessary to uncover, analyze, organize, and verbalize circum-
stances that "give rise to a strong inference that the defendants had [scien-
ter].3' 17 In sum, introducing the substantive scienter requirement without
also requiring an enhanced pleading standard under rule 9(b) increases
the litigation differential and the incentive to initiate nuisance litigation.
This result runs counter to the policy of conserving judicial resources as
well as the Supreme Court's intention to deter nuisance securities litiga-
tion by implementing the substantive scienter requirement.6 8
Finally, the other circuits' less rigorous pleading standard reduces rule
9(b)'s effectiveness as a tool for dismissing nuisance litigation. Plaintiffs
can more easily meet the lower pleading standard, regardless of the merits
of their claims. It therefore allows questionable actions that would be dis-
missed in the Second Circuit to survive the pleading stage. 9
One result of this ineffectiveness is that the other circuit courts expend
many more judicial resources in disposing of nuisance lawsuits. Absent an
enhanced pleading requirement, more nuisance suits survive the pleading
65. Professor Coffee has noted:
[Tihe financial burdens associated with discovery fall more heavily on the defendants. Without
much time or effort, the experienced plaintiffs' attorney can prepare a voluminous list of inter-
rogatories and demand production of crates of documents. Responding to these requests takes
more time; files must be searched, answers drafted, and objections made. Witnesses must also
be prepared for deposition, and this can involve a rehearsal process that exceeds the length of
the actual deposition.
Coffee, supra note 33, at 17. Discovery regarding scienter is especially difficult, expensive, and time
consuming because it necessarily involves inquiry into persons' states of mind at various points in
time.
66. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 192 n.7, 193 (1976).
67. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946
(1980).
68. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
69. Compare Denny v. Carey, 78 F.R.D. 370 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (complaint not challenged on rule
9(b) grounds) with Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1978) (affirming dismissal with prejudice
of complaint virtually identical to that filed in Carey for failure to allege fraud with particularity
required by rule 9(b)); compare Deutsch v. Flannery, 823 F.2d 1361, 1363 (9th Cir. 1987) (reversing
district court's dismissal of two of plaintiffs' § 10(b) and rule lob-5 claims; complaint's statement of
said claims sufficiently particular to satisfy rule 9(b)) with Deutsch v. Flannery, 597 F. Supp. 917
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (complaint dismissed without prejudice for failure to allege facts indicating scienter
with particularity required by rule 9(b)).
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stage and continue to absorb judicial resources with discovery issues and
dispositive motions as they proceed toward trial or settlement.
The strongest argument against the Second Circuit interpretation of
rule 9(b) is that its benefits may come at the price of an unacceptably high
risk of deterrence and premature dismissal of meritorious claims." Plain-
tiffs in the Second Circuit allegedly are deterred from making meritorious
claims because, although they may satisfy the rule 9(b) standard with re-
spect to the other elements of a section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 cause of
action, they are unable to plead scienter with sufficient particularity with-
out some discovery,7" which they would be denied. Meritorious suits are
therefore dismissed prematurely or never initiated because plaintiffs are
unable to plead essential facts that are peculiarly within defendants' ken
and control. The risk is "that the defendant has so effectively concealed
[its] wrongdoing that the plaintiff can unearth it only with discovery. To
insist on details as a prerequisite to discovery is putting the cart before the
horse."17 2
In summary, the Second Circuit's stricter interpretation of rule 9(b)
with respect to pleading scienter may be preferable to the position of the
other circuits because it offers a superior method of handling nuisance
litigation, and because it remains more consistent with the policy goals
underlying the introduction of a substantive scienter requirement. How-
ever, this cure is potentially worse than the disease if it deters or dismisses
meritorious claims.
B. Proposal
The above analysis suggests that a slight modification of the implemen-
tation of the Second Circuit scienter pleading standard would remedy its
deficiencies while retaining virtually all of the advantages that make it the
preferred interpretation of rule 9(b). The proposed modification would
allow plaintiff limited discovery73 for the sole purpose of enabling her to
attempt to meet the elevated Second Circuit scienter pleading requirement.
Such discovery would be permitted only if the plaintiff 1) has met all
other, non-scienter pleading standards; 2) has conducted a reasonable in-
70. Note, supra note 12, at 1435, 1438.
71. Plaintiffs may be unable to specify the circumstances that lead to an inference of scienter for
two interrelated reasons. First, § 10(b) plaintiffs generally have had contact with the defendant only
indirectly and through impersonal market channels when they acquired their securities. Plaintiffs
therefore have little firsthand knowledge about the particulars of potentially fraudulent transactions.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 745 (1975) ("In today's universe of transac-
tions governed by the 1934 Act, privity of dealing or even personal contact between potential defen-
dant and potential plaintiff is the exception and not the rule."); Note, supra note 12, at 1436. Second,
due to the "shroud of secrecy that surrounds most current capital-market transactions," plaintiffs
encounter practical difficulties in ascertaining the particulars of potentially fraudulent transactions.
Id. at 1438-39.
72. Marcus, supra note 12, at 468.
73. See infra note 83.
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quiry consistent with rule 1174 in an attempt to meet the scienter pleading
requirement; and 3) has been unable to meet the scienter pleading stan-
dard because the necessary information is peculiarly within the knowledge
of defendant.75 If plaintiff cannot meet the enhanced scienter pleading re-
quirement after this limited discovery, the action should be dismissed with
prejudice.7 1
1. Procedure
The proposed limited discovery procedure ("LDP") would be triggered
by defendant's rule 9(b) motion to dismiss in response to a complaint.7 7
Under the LDP, the plaintiff would incorporate a request for limited dis-
covery into the response she normally would file in opposition to defen-
dant's rule 9(b) motion. Plaintiff's LDP request would have two compo-
nents: 1) an affidavit regarding the extent of her research as to defendant's
scienter;78 and 2) a proposed discovery request.79
Under the LDP, the decision as to whether to allow limited discovery
would be made during the hearing on defendant's rule 9(b) motion. If the
plaintiff's complaint does not meet all non-scienter pleading requirements
under rule 9(b), the suit would be dismissed with leave to replead and
without prejudice.80 If plaintiff's complaint meets the non-scienter plead-
ing requirements and meets the enhanced scienter pleading requirement
74. Rule 11 provides, in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or party [on a pleading, motion, or other paper] constitutes a
certificate by the signer that . . . to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief
fonned after a reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it
is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis supplied).
75. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
76. See infra note 86.
77. Presumably the LDP would take place prior to determination of the class certification ques-
tion. Treating the question of class certification prior to the LDP would be inconsistent with the goals
of the LDP because it would delay the dismissal of non-meritorious suits as well as increase the
litigation differential by forcing the defendant to expend the resources necessary to oppose class
certification.
78. The affidavit would take the form of a statement wherein plaintiff's counsel avers that, after
reasonable inquiry, she has been unable to discover sufficient circumstances to create an inference of
scienter because, to the best of her knowledge, information and belief, those circumstances are within
the exclusive control of the defendant. Counsel would attach a list of the sources she has consulted in
her inquiry as an exhibit to this affidavit.
79. The LDP proposed discovery request would be a list of the documents plaintiff wishes to
examine, the persons she would like to depose, and the interrogatories she wants answered in her
effort to meet the enhanced scienter pleading standard. Because of the limited scope of the LDP, the
discovery request would contain an explanation, on an element by element basis, of the reason(s) for
plaintiff's belief that each element of the request is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
circumstances that would support an inference of scienter.
80. This procedure is effectively authorized by FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a), which authorizes a party to
amend its pleading "once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served
...." Id. It would be highly unusual for a defendant to file an answer to the original, unamended
complaint after an order dismissing the case but granting plaintiff leave to replead.
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then defendant's rule 9(b) motion would be denied. If plaintiff has not
met the scienter pleading standard, and her LDP request meets the other
two criteria described above, then the judge would convene a discovery
conference pursuant to rule 26(081 as a part of the rule 9(b) hearing. At
the rule 26(f) conference, the judicial officer82 would determine the scope
of the limited discovery8" to be granted plaintiff."" Plaintiff would be af-
forded leave to amend her complaint within a specified period, if so ad-
vised, to reflect any new information uncovered during the limited discov-
ery allowed.
If the plaintiff does not replead after the limited discovery, her com-
plaint would be dismissed with prejudice."' If, however, the plaintiff
amends the complaint, the defendant could renew its rule 9(b) motion,
precipitating another hearing, or allow the action to proceed. If the de-
fendant renews its rule 9(b) motion, a second rule 9(b) hearing would be
convened to determine whether the amended complaint meets the en-
hanced scienter pleading standard. If she has, pre-trial proceedings would
continue; if she has not, her complaint would be dismissed with
prejudice.86
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (timing, scope, and procedure of discovery conference).
82. In practice, it might be more appropriate for a magistrate who has some familiarity with the
securities area to preside over the rule 26(f) conference. The magistrate, because of her specialized
knowledge, would more likely be able to fashion a fair "scope" order than the trial judge.
83. The "limited" discovery suggested by this Note differs from the "limited" discovery proposed
by another commentator. See, Note, supra note 12, at 1443. The "limited" discovery advocated by this
other commentator takes place after a plaintiff has satisfied the rule 9(b) pleading standard, and it is
"limited" only in the sense that the judge takes an active role in "managing" the discovery to ensure
that plaintiff's discovery requests are not overly broad and/or burdensome by, among other things,
limiting the discovery to particular issues. The scope of the discovery, however, remains unlimited.
Plaintiff's goal is to discover facts sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant(s) acted with scienter. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89, 390
(1983) (preponderance of evidence standard is appropriate standard of proof in private damages ac-
tions under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5). Further, discovery may proceed on all issues simultaneously.
In contrast, the limited discovery under the proposed LDP would take place before the complaint
meets the rule 9(b) standard. More importantly, it is "limited" in scope. Plaintiff's goal under the
LDP would be to discover facts sufficient to give rise to a strong inference that the defendant(s) acted
with scienter. The extent of discovery reasonably necessary to meet this limited goal would be far less
than under "managed" discovery because the level of proof the plaintiff seeks would be so much
lower. Further, the narrow scope inherent in the LDP would limit the costs plaintiffs can impose on
defendants through discovery. Thus, the litigation differential would be significantly smaller under the
LDP than under the post-certification, full scope, managed discovery proposed by the other
commentator.
84. Presumably, the judicial officer would grant or modify the proposed discovery request con-
tained in plaintiff's response to defendant's rule 9(b) motion.
85. "Where ... the order of dismissal without prejudice is subject to certain conditions that
plaintiff[s] must comply with, the court may render a judgment of dismissal with prejudice upon
plaintiff's failure to comply with the conditions." 5 J. MOORE & J. LucAS, MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 41.0512], at 41-66 (2d ed. 1990). These conditions can include leave to replead within a
specified time period. For an example of this theory in action, see Kimmel v. Labenski, [1987-1988
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,651, at 97,991 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Haight, J.) ("I
grant plaintiff leave to replead with respect to all defendants. If so advised, plaintiff may file and serve
an amended complaint within sixty (60) days of the date of this order, failing whi[c]h the fraud claims
will be dismissed with prejudice.").
86. Where plaintiffs have had an opportunity to amend their complaint with notice of its deficien-
cies and have failed to correct them, dismissal with prejudice is proper. Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d
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2. Scope and Methods of Discovery
Both the scope and methods of the discovery to be allowed plaintiff
under the LDP must be left largely to the discretion of the judicial officer.
In deciding how much discovery will be allowed and what methods will
be available to the plaintiff, the decisionmaker ought to apply a standard
which both minimizes the defendant's cost of compliance and allows the
plaintiff to discover the information needed to meet the enhanced scienter
pleading standard. Such discovery should be limited to documents, deposi-
tions, and interrogatories reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of cir-
cumstances giving rise to an inference of scienter. This standard is consis-
tent with the standard applicable to general discovery set forth in rule
26(b)(1).17 The decisionmaker must have discretion to afford or to deny
plaintiff the use of any or all of the discovery methods available in general
discovery practice88 in order to tailor the limited discovery to individual
fact situations. For example, in litigation concerning a transaction, the
plaintiff may need to depose one or more of the parties to the transaction
in her attempt to meet the enhanced scienter pleading requirement, while
in an action against an accounting firm, discovery of the accountants'
workpapers may be sufficient.8"
Authority for implementing the LDP lies in rule 26(0, which au-
thorizes a court to convene a discovery conference "[alt any time after
commencement of an action" and requires the court to "enter an order
tentatively identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a
plan and schedule for discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any;
and determining such other matters, including the allocation of expenses,
as are necessary for the proper management of discovery in the action."90
Further, the order "may be altered or amended whenever justice so re-
49, 56 (2d Cir. 1986); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1983); Decker v. Massey-
Ferguson, 681 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1982); Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470-71 (2d Cir. 1978).
The plaintiff will have had two opportunities to demonstrate a basis for the serious charges made
against the defendants. Having failed to meet the requirements of rule 9(b) even after limited discov-
ery granted under the proposed LDP, plaintiff should not be entitled to a third bite at the apple.
Furthermore, fairness, efficiency, and common sense all dictate that plaintiff's complaint be dis-
missed with prejudice at this juncture. Plaintiff has already had discovery and cannot meet the rule
9(b) standard. Merely granting her an extension and allowing a repleading is thus highly unlikely to
lead to uncovering new facts sufficient to give rise to an inference that defendants acted with scienter.
Thus, dismissal at this time is not unfair to plaintiff. The defendants have been subjected to discovery
and forced to respond to an amended complaint. Fairness dictates that the defendants are entitled to
final judgment on the matter. Dismissal with prejudice is efficient because it acts as res judicata to bar
another action by this plaintiff on the claim so dismissed, and thus prevents re-litigation of non-
meritorious claims as well as harassment of the defendant. Finally, common sense indicates that once
a plaintiff has had discovery, merely giving her more time to re-research and replead her complaint
has little chance of producing any significant new information.
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
88. Plaintiff may thus request the use of depositions (FED. R. Civ. P. 30), depositions upon
written questions (FED. R. Civ. P. 31), interrogatories (FED. R. Civ. P. 33), document production
(FED. R. Civ. P. 34), and requests for admission (FED. R. Civ. P. 36).
89. See In re Frank B. Hall & Co. Sees. Litigation, 693 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (emphasis supplied).
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quires."91 Under the LDP, the court would convene a discovery confer-
ence during the hearing on defendant's rule 9(b) motion and would enter
an oral or written order: 1) identifying the issue for discovery purposes as
the elucidation of the existence of circumstances leading to an inference of
scienter; 2) setting a timetable for discovery on this issue; and 3) narrow-
ing the scope of the discovery in accordance with the limited issue.
3. 7npact
The proposed LDP would sacrifice a minimal amount of nuisance suit
deterrence and dismissal force relative to the current Second Circuit prac-
tice because it would result in a relatively small increase in the litigation
differential. This marginal increase would consist of the cost to the de-
fendant of the limited discovery that may be made available to plaintiffs, 92
less plaintiff's counsel's cost of pursuing that discovery. However, this cost
increment should be minimal enough for the defendant to incur and re-
main in the lawsuit seeking dismissal, rather than opting for a nuisance
value settlement.93
Further, the LDP should reduce the undue deterrence or dismissal flaw
inherent in the Second Circuit standard. Plaintiffs able to meet the non-
scienter pleading standards and willing to conduct a good faith search for
the "circumstances from which scienter may be inferred" would be given
a fair opportunity to discover the facts necessary to meet the enhanced
pleading requirement. Accordingly, they would not be deterred from initi-
ating meritorious lawsuits, nor would such lawsuits be dismissed on rule
9(b) motions.
While the LDP would lower a nuisance suit's chance of dismissal rela-
tive to the Second Circuit's interpretation of rule 9(b), it would represent
a significant improvement on the other circuits' interpretation because it
would provide the advantages of the stricter scienter pleading standard.9 '
At the same time, the LDP's great benefit would be that the plaintiffs
who take advantage of it should be plaintiffs with valid claims whose suits
might have been dismissed in the Second Circuit due to lack of reasonable
discovery. Under the LDP, courts would be able to dismiss section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 cases on the pleadings with greater confidence because
plaintiffs will have received an opportunity for discovery consistent with
the likelihood that they would succeed on the merits.
The LDP would confer these benefits at a relatively minor cost in judi-
cial resources compared to the current Second Circuit standard. It would
91. Id.
92. Obviously, these costs will be non-trivial in absolute terms, especially in cases where many
"players" were involved in the allegedly fraudulent transaction(s).
93. See In re Frank B. Hall & Co. Secs. Litigation, 693 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (defen-
dant accounting firm submitted voluntarily to discovery of its workpapers).
94. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
1990] 1607
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 99: 1591
require no additional procedural layers,95 and the LDP would retain the
Second Circuit enhanced pleading requirement's benefit of conserving ju-
dicial resources through deterrence and early dismissal of nuisance claims.
Finally, the LDP would impose no new obligations on judges in terms of
discovery rulings. Judges already make such "scope" rulings under rule
26(f) and would merely apply a similar standard here.96
The LDP would thus be consistent with the purposes of rule 9(b). The
LDP clearly would "serve[] to minimize strike suits."9 The LDP would
provide further "assurance that the pleader has investigated the alleged
fraud and reasonably believes that a wrong has occurred."98 The LDP
would "serve[] to reinforce the basic notice function of pleadings under the
Federal Rules."99 Finally, by deterring the filing of nuisance suits, the
LDP would "protect [defendants'] reputations from unwarranted charges
of fraud;" 1 0 this purpose is especially important where, as is often the
case in section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 actions, "the defendants are profes-
sionals whose livelihood may depend on their reputation and the goodwill
of their business in the community." 10'
The LDP also would be consistent with the purposes underlying the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934102 as well as section 10(b) and rule
10b-5. 3  The LDP would not limit completeness or effectiveness of secur-
95. Rule 9(b) hearings currently take place in all circuits, and at least one rule 26(f) conference is
likely to occur at some point in the pre-trial stages of a class action, whether or not defendant moves
to dismiss the action on rule 9(b) grounds. The LDP would merely advance the timing of the first
rule 26(f) conference to an earlier stage in the proceedings.
96. The LDP is consistent with the current trend of conservation of judicial resources through
case management. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a) advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment (case
management is an express goal of pre-trial procedure).
97. 2A J. MOORE & J. LucAs, supra note 85, 9.03[1], at 9-31 to -32 (2d ed. 1990) (citations
omitted). The LDP by its very nature would serve to limit strike suits by limiting plaintiff's perceived
litigation differential. See supra Section If(B).
98. 2A J. MOORE & J. LucAs, supra note 85, T 9.0311], at 9-32 (2d ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
The LDP would require plaintiff to detail the extent of her research, thereby allowing the court to
assess both the extent of plaintiff's research and the reasonableness of her belief that a wrong has
occurred.
99. Id. at 9-33 (citations omitted). One goal of the LDP is to force plaintiff to provide defendant
with enough information to prepare a response to the complaint and to apprise defendant fairly of the
charge against her. See supra note 24.
100. 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 85, 1 9.03[1], at 9-31 (2d ed. 1990) (citations omit-
ted); see supra note 24.
101. 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 85, 9.03[1], at 9-31 (2d ed. 1990) (citations
omitted).
102. "In enacting the 1934 Act, Congress stated that its purpose was 'to impose requirements
necessary to make [securities] regulation and control reasonably complete and effective.' 15 U.S.C. §
78b." Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 (1983). "Congress' aim in enacting the
[Securities Exchange Act of 1934] was not confined solely to compensating defrauded investors. [It
also] intended to deter fraud and manipulative practices in the securities markets .... " Randall v.
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986).
103. The legislative history of § 10(b) is "bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent."
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976). "As with Section 10(b), the administrative
history of 10b-5 is so scant that courts have not often been guided by it." 5 A. JACOBS, LITIGATION
AND PRACTICE UNDER RuLE 1OB-5, § 5.02, at 1-185 (2d ed. 1989). Thus, one must look to judicial
interpretations of the section and the rule to determine their purpose and scope.
Various courts have provided such interpretations. Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 "were intended to
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ities regulation and control and would not prevent the compensation of
defrauded investors. Finally, the LDP would do little if anything to limit
the deterrent effect of section 10(b) or rule 10b-5.
CONCLUSION
The LDP, along with its elevated scienter pleading requirement, would
be a narrowly tailored solution to the problem of nuisance litigation under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. It would represent an improvement over the
present system at two levels. First, the LDP would comport with the poli-
cies underlying rule 9(b), section 10(b), and rule 10b-5, and would ad-
vance important policy goals.104 It would effectively deter the initiation of
nuisance suits 05 and would be a useful tool for summarily dismissing
those that are filed.'0 6 It would strike at the economic roots of nuisance
litigation while simultaneously allowing courts to dismiss nuisance law-
suits and claims at the pleading stage with a high degree of confidence
that they are in fact nuisance suits. Moreover, this "gatekeeping" function
would confer the added benefit of conserving the judicial resources now
required to process nuisance suits. 0 7 Finally, meritorious suits would still
proceed, and thus the LDP would not lessen the deterrent effect of poten-
tial securities actions on corporate actors.
On a broader level, the LDP would increase public confidence in the
legal system by preventing malefactors from avoiding liability on proce-
dural grounds, while simultaneously preventing the waste of corporate as-
sets by promoting summary dismissal of non-meritorious lawsuits. In the
end, the LDP would promote efficient corporate operation by reducing
the quantity of resources expended on the disposition of non-meritorious
lawsuits.
provide a cause of action for any plaintiff who suffers an injury as a result of manipulative or decep-
tive practices made in connection with his or her sale or purchase of securities." Norris v. Wirtz, 719
F.2d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929 (1984) (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977)). The purpose of § 10(b) and its accompanying rule
is to protect persons who are deceived in securities transactions-to make sure that buyers of
securities get what they think they are getting and that sellers of securities are not tricked into
parting with something for a price known to the buyer to be inadequate or for a consideration
known to the buyer not to be what it purports to be.
Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 943 (2d Cir. 1984) (Friendly, J.).
104. See supra Part III.
105. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
107. See supra pp. 1602-03.
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